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Abstract
Propagation of balance-sheet or cash-flow insolvency across financial institutions may be
modeled as a cascade process on a network representing their mutual exposures. We derive
rigorous asymptotic results for the magnitude of contagion in a large financial network and
give an analytical expression for the asymptotic fraction of defaults, in terms of network
characteristics. Our results extend previous studies on contagion in random graphs to
inhomogeneous directed graphs with a given degree sequence and arbitrary distribution
of weights. We introduce a criterion for the resilience of a large financial network to the
insolvency of a small group of financial institutions and quantify how contagion amplifies
small shocks to the network. Our results emphasize the role played by “contagious links”
and show that institutions which contribute most to network instability in case of default
have both large connectivity and a large fraction of contagious links. The asymptotic results
show good agreement with simulations for networks with realistic sizes.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the complex nature of linkages between financial
institutions. From balance-sheet exposures, to more opaque obligations related to over-the-
counter derivatives like credit default swaps, such linkages propagated and amplified financial
distress. Initial losses in one asset class –mortgage backed securities– turned into losses that
threatened the stability of the whole financial system. More than 370 of the almost 8000 US
bank companies have failed since 2007. This was clearly an episode of large default contagion,
if we compare to a number of 30 defaults in the period 2000− 2004, and no defaults occurred
in the period 2005− 2006.
The acknowledgement of different types of interbank connections and the associated conta-
gion mechanisms led to an increased advocacy to account for network effects when discussing
regulatory requirements [24, 14]. In the growing body of work dedicated to systemic risk, sev-
eral distress propagation mechanisms have been pinpointed, including primarily two types of
insolvency: balance-sheet insolvency and cash-flow insolvency. A bank is said to be balace-
sheet insolvent if the value of its liabilities exceeds the value of its assets and, it is said to be
cash-flow insolvent if it cannot meet its contractual payment obligations arrived at maturity.
Cascades of insolvencies can be understood as domino effects and are a type of potent
financial contagion that is quantifiable.
Most investigated, balance-sheet insolvency contagion can be described as follows: party A
has a balance sheet exposure to party B, where we understand by exposure the maximum loss
incurred by A on its balance sheet claims upon the default of B. If B defaults, the capital of
party A must absorb the corresponding loss. If the capital cannot withstand the loss, party A
becomes balance sheet insolvent .
Another contagion mechanism that can be described in similar terms is represented by
cascades of cash-flow insolvencies. Over-the-counter derivatives markets are prone to such
type of cascades. Indeed, in these markets parties deal directly with one another rather than
passing through an exchange. As such, they are subject to the risk that the other party
does not fulfill its payment obligations. Consider two parties A and B, such that A has a
receivable from party B upon the realization of some event. If B does not dispose of enough
liquid reserves, it will default on the payment. Now consider that B has entered an off-setting
contract with another party C, hedging its exposure to the random event. If C is cash-flow
solvent, then the payment will flow through the intermediary B and reach A. However, if C
is cash-flow insolvent and defaults, then the intermediary B might become cash-flow insolvent
if it depends on receivables from C to meet its payment obligations to A. As it turns out,
the length of such chains of intermediaries in certain over-the-counter markets, like the credit
default swap market, is significant [15, 16], thereby increasing the probability of a cascade of
cash-flow insolvencies.1
Some of previous work, mostly in the economics and sociology literature, investigates cas-
cades on networks in a generic context; relevant references include Morris [42], Kleinberg [34],
Jackson and Yariv [28] and Watts [50]. These models consider, in one form or another, a
mechanism by which an agent decides to adopt one of two states depending on the state of its
1 The trigger of a cash-flow insolvency cascade in a chain of intermediaries may be a counterparty that is not
contractually required to post collateral when all other entities have this obligation.
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neighbors and a threshold which measures its susceptibility to this direct influence. Propaga-
tion of insolvency in banking networks fall under the irreversible version of this model [50, 34]
; default is not reversible, unlike the case of agents playing a network game who can revise
their decisions [42]. The default threshold of a given bank depends on its level of capital (resp.
liquidity reserve), the state of balance sheet (resp. cash-flow) solvency of its direct counterpar-
ties and the linkages to them. More recent work studies network formation as a result of the
interplay between benefits from creating links and negative network externalities [36].
In the finance literature, in the context of banking systems, contagion effects and network
externalities have been investigated in both in theoretical [1, 10, 19, 22, 45] and empirical
studies [17, 20, 49, 44]. Network externalities are –implicitly or explicitly– present in various
early discussions of systemic risk (see e.g., Hellwig [25], Kiyotaki and Moore [33], Rochet and
Tirole [46]) through the interlinkages between balance sheets. Allen and Gale [1] pioneered
the use of network models in the study of the stability of a system of interconnected financial
institutions. Their results were extended in various directions by Lagunoff and Schreft [35] and
Leitner [37].
One of the central problems tackled in this literature is understanding the relation between
the cascading behavior of the network and the underlying topology: Is the network such that
the state of a small number of nodes will propagate to a large number of nodes, or will contagion
die out quickly?
The discussion was either dominated by highly stylized networks, whose structure turns out
to be quite different from the heterogenous structure of real networks –financial networks are
particularly heterogenous, as many of the empirical studies [13, 47, 17] make a clear case– or
the results were heuristic in nature and based on mean field approximations [50, 22]. Notable
exceptions come from the random graphs literature, where cascade models are investigated on
graphs with given degree sequences [2, 38]. One crucial aspect that does not appear in the
previous literature is the heterogeneity of weights: whether interpreted as exposures or receiv-
ables, these linkages carry weights with a heavy tailed distribution. This point –corroborated
by simulations [17]– prevents from reducing the analysis of contagion in banking networks to
the case where a node’s aggregate exposure is distributed equally across counterparties as in
[22, 39].
In light of insights coming from empirical studies and simulations, we redefine the problem
as relating the cascading behavior of financial networks both to the local properties of the nodes
and to the underlying topology of the network. Since balance-sheet and cash-flow insolvency
cascades are similar from a mathematical modeling point of view, the challenge lies not so
much in analyzing a model that is flexible enough to represent both these types of insolvency
cascades, but in proposing a model that can mimic the empirical properties of these different
types of networks and that is tractable enough to be able to prove theorems about the cascading
behavior.
Our problem is set form the point of view of a regulator who observes the network. Our
primary goal is not to identify nodes posing the highest systemic risk. Clearly, when one
knows the entire network and assuming the network is fairly small, those could be identified
by extensive simulations. Alternatively, for threshold models of contagion in large networks
one could use approximation algorithms to find sets of most influential nodes [32, 43]. Indeed,
problems like the Influence Maximization Problem have been shown NP-hard to approximate
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within a factor 1− 1/e+ ε for all ε > 0 [32], but under certain sub-modularity conditions there
exists a greedy 1− 1/e− ε - approximation algorithm for this problem [43].
The fundamental question that we tackle, unanswered so for realistic networks, is how to
identify the features that make nodes systemically important. The obvious purpose is the need
to set rules that would mitigate such features and consequently systemic risk.
Our approach is to consider an ensemble of networks in which one can prescribe each
node’s connectivity and characteristics that are relevant to the respective cascade mechanisms:
balance sheet insolvency cascades depend on capital ratios and the asset side of the balance
sheets; cash-flow cascades depend on liquidity reserves and cash flows related to positions in
the trading book. When the number of banks is large, cascades on networks belonging to this
ensemble behave in a way dictated by the prescribed characteristics.
1.1 Summary
In this paper we develop techniques for analyzing default cascades in random weighted directed
networks with arbitrary degree sequences, in which a set of local features can be prescribed for
each node in the network.
Our contribution is to derive rigorous asymptotic results for the magnitude of contagion in
such networks and give an analytical expression for the asymptotic fraction of defaults. Our
results apply to a wide variety of topologies and provide analytical insights into the nature of the
relation between network structure, local characteristics of nodes and contagion in large-scale
networks.
For simplicity, we formulate our results in terms of balace-sheet insolvency cascades in a
network of financial institutions with interlinked balance sheets, where losses flow into the
asset side of the balance sheets. Similar techniques may be used for analyzing cascades of
cash-flow insolvency in over-the-counter markets, as briefly discussed above and detailed in
[40]. From now on, we refer to balance-sheet insolvency simply as insolvency.
Our proof is based on a coupling argument: We construct a related multigraph –a weighted
configuration model– which leads to the same number of defaults as in the original contagion
process but is easier to study because of its independence properties. The contagion process in
this model may then be described by a Markov chain. Generalizing the differential equation
method of Wormald [51] to the case where the dimension of the Markov chain depends on the
size of the network we show that, as the network size increases, the rescaled Markov chain
converges in probability to a limit described by a system of ordinary differential equations,
which can be solved in closed form. This enables us to obtain analytical results on the final
fraction of defaults in the network.
These results generalize previous ones on diffusions in random graphs with prescribed degree
sequence to the case of inhomogeneous and weighted random directed graphs with arbitrary
degree sequences. Related problems are the problem of existence of a giant component in
random graphs [18, 41] and bootstrap percolation problem. Bootstrap percolation process 2 is a
2A bootstrap percolation process on a graph G is an “infection” process which evolves in rounds. Initially,
there is a subset of infected nodes and in each subsequent round each uninfected node which has at least r
infected neighbors becomes infected and remains so forever (The parameter r ≥ 2 is fixed.).
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very simple models of difusions which have been studied on a variety of graphs, such as trees [8],
grids [26, 7], hypercubes [6], as well as on several distributions of random graphs [2, 3, 5, 31, 9].
Another important result of our work –and probably the most important from the regulatory
point of view– is the introduction of a measure of resilience of a financial network to small initial
shocks. The contribution of each node to systemic risk is quantifiable in terms of its connectivity
and local characteristics. Our measure may be used as a tool for stress testing the resilience of
interbank networks in a decentralized way [4] and as an assessment tool of the capital adequacy
of each bank with respect to its exposures.
1.2 Outline
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a model for a network of financial
institutions and describes a mechanism for default contagion in such a network. Section 3 gives
our main result on the asymptotic magnitude of contagion. Section 3.4 uses this result to define
a measure of resilience for a financial network: We show that when this indicator of resilience
crosses a threshold, small initial shocks to the network –in the form of the exogenous default
of a small set of nodes– may generate a large-scale cascade of failures, a signature of systemic
risk. Section 4 illustrates, through concrete examples, how the resilience measure allows us to
quantify and predict the outcome of contagion on one sample network generated from a random
network model that mimics the properties of a real interbank exposure network analyzed in
[17]. We observe that networks with the same average connectivity may amplify initial shocks
in very different manners and their resilience to contagion can vastly differ. In particular, the
relation between ‘connectivity’ and ’contagion’ is not monotonous. Technical proofs are given
in Appendix A.
2 A network model of default contagion
In this section, we first introduce a model of a financial network, then describe the default
cascade on this network, and finally the probabilistic setting we use throughout the paper.
2.1 Counterparty networks
Interlinkages across balance sheets of financial institutions may be modeled by a weighted
directed graph G = (V, e) on the vertex set V = {1, . . . , n} = [n], whose elements represent
financial institutions. The exposure matrix is given by e ∈ Rn×n, where the ij-th entry e(i, j)
represents the exposure (in monetary units) of institution i to institution j. Table 1 displays
a stylized balance sheet of a financial institution. The interbank assets of an institution i are
given by
A(i) :=
∑
j
e(i, j).
Note that
∑
j e(j, i) represents the interbank liabilities of i. In addition to these interbank
assets and liabilities, a bank may hold other assets and liabilities (such as deposits).
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Assets Liabilities
Interbank assets Interbank liabilities∑
j e(i, j)
∑
j e(j, i)
Deposits
D(i)
Other Net worth
assets
x(i) c(i) = γ(i)A(i)
Table 1: Stylized balance sheet of a bank.
The net worth of the bank, given by its capital c(i), represents its capacity for absorbing
losses while remaining solvent. We will refer to the ratio
γ(i) :=
c(i)
A(i)
as the “capital ratio” of institution i, although technically it is the ratio of capital to interbank
assets and not total assets.
An institution is insolvent if its net worth is negative or zero, in which case we set γ(i) = 0.
Definition 2.1 (Financial network). A financial network (e, γ) on the vertex set V = [n] is
defined by
• a matrix of exposures {e(i, j)}1≤i,j≤n,
• a set of capital ratios {γ(i)}1≤i≤n.
In this network, the in-degree of a node i is given by
d−(i) := #{j ∈ V | e(j, i) > 0},
which represents the number of nodes exposed to i, while its out-degree
d+(i) := #{j ∈ V | e(i, j) > 0}
represents the number of institutions i is exposed to.
The set of initially insolvent institutions is represented by
D0(e, γ) = {i ∈ V | γ(i) = 0}.
The next section defines the default cascade triggered by nodes in D0(e, γ).
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2.2 Default contagion
In a network (e, γ) of counterparties, the default of one or several nodes may lead to the
insolvency of other nodes, generating a cascade of defaults.
Starting from the set of initially insolvent institutions D0(e, γ) which represent fundamental
defaults, we define a contagion process as follows.
Denoting by R(j) the recovery rate on the assets of j at default, the default of j induces
a loss equal to (1 − R(j))e(i, j) for its counterparty i. If this loss exceeds the capital of i,
then i becomes in turn insolvent. Recall that c(i) = γ(i)A(i). The set of nodes which become
insolvent due to their exposures to initial defaults is
D1(e, γ) = {i ∈ V | γ(i)A(i) <
∑
j∈D0
(1−R(j))e(i, j)}.
This procedure may be iterated to define the default cascade initiated by a set of initial defaults.
Definition 2.2 (Default cascade). Consider a financial network (e, γ) on the vertex set V = [n].
Set D0(e, γ) = {i ∈ V | γ(i) = 0} of initially insolvent institutions. The increasing sequence
(Dk(e, γ), k ≥ 1) of subsets of V defined by
Dk(e, γ) = {i ∈ V | γ(i)A(i) <
∑
j∈Dk−1(e,γ)
(1−R(j))e(i, j)}
is called the default cascade initiated by D0(e, γ).
Thus Dk(e, γ) represents the set of institutions whose capital is insufficient to absorb losses
due to defaults of institutions in Dk−1(e, γ).
It is easy to see that, in a network of size n, the cascade ends after at most n− 1 iterations.
Hence, Dn−1(e, γ) represents the set of all nodes which become insolvent starting from the
initial set of defaults D0(e, γ).
Definition 2.3. Consider a financial network (e, γ) on the vertex set V = [n]. The fraction of
defaults in the network (e, γ) (initiated by D0(e, γ)) is given by
αn(e, γ) :=
|Dn−1(e, γ)|
n
.
The recovery rates R(i) may be exogenous or, as in Eisenberg and Noe [19], determined
endogenously by redistributing assets of a defaulted entity among debtors, proportionally to
their outstanding debt. As noted in [48, 17], the latter scenario is too optimistic since in practice
liquidation takes time and assets may depreciate in value due to fire sales during liquidation.
As argued in [17, 20], when examining the short term consequences of default, the most realistic
assumption on recovery rates is zero: Assets held with a defaulted counterparty are frozen until
liquidation takes place, a process which can in practice take months to terminate.
For simplicity, we assume from now on that recovery rates are constant for all institutions:
R(i) = R, ∀i ∈ V.
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2.3 A random network model
Empirical studies on interbank exposures [13, 17] show such networks to have a complex and
heterogeneous structure characterized by heavy-tailed (cross-sectional) distributions of degrees
and exposures.
Given a description of the large-scale structure of the network in statistical terms, it is
natural to model the network as a random graph whose statistical properties correspond to
these observations.
Consider a sequence (en, γn)n≥1 of financial networks, indexed by the number of nodes n,
where d+n = {d+n (i)}ni=1 (resp. d−n = {d−n (i)}ni=1) represents the sequence of in-degrees (resp.
out-degrees) of nodes in en. We now construct a random network En such that en may be
considered as a typical sample of En.
Definition 2.4 (Random network ensemble). Let Gn(en) be the set of all weighted directed
graphs with degree sequence d+n ,d
−
n such that, for any node i, the set of exposures is given by
the non-zero elements of line i in the exposure matrix en. Let (Ω,A,P) be a probability space.
We define En : Ω→ Gn(en) as a random directed graph uniformly distributed on Gn(en).
We endow the nodes in En with the capital ratios γn. Then for all i = 1, . . . , n,
{En(i, j), En(i, j) 6= 0} = {en(i, j), en(i, j) 6= 0} P− a.s.
#{j ∈ V, En(j, i) > 0} = d+n (j), and #{j ∈ V, En(i, j) 6= 0} = d−n (i).
Definition 2.4 is equivalent to the representation of the financial system by an unweighted
graph chosen uniformly among all graphs with the degree sequence (d+n ,d
−
n ), in which we assign
to the links emanating from node i the set of weights {en(i, j) > 0}.
3 Asymptotic results
We consider a sequence of random financial networks as introduced above. Our goal is to
study the behavior of αn(En, γn) which represents the final fraction of defaults in the cascade
generated by the set of initially insolvent institutions, i.e., D0(En, γn) = {i ∈ [n] | γn(i) = 0}.
3.1 Some probability-theoretic notation
We let N0 be the set of non-negative integers, i.e., N0 = N ∪ {0}. For non-negative sequences
xn and yn, we describe their relative order of magnitude using Landau’s o(.) and O(.) notation.
We write xn = O(yn) if there exist N ∈ N and C > 0 such that xn ≤ Cyn for all n ≥ N , and
xn = o(yn), if xn/yn → 0, as n→∞.
Let {Xn}n∈N be a sequence of real-valued random variables on a sequence of probability
spaces {(Ωn,Pn)}n∈N. If c ∈ R is a constant, we write Xn p→ c to denote that Xn converges in
probability to c. That is, for any ε > 0, we have Pn(|Xn − c| > ε)→ 0 as n→∞.
Let {an}n∈N be a sequence of real numbers that tends to infinity as n → ∞. We write
Xn = op(an), if |Xn|/an converges to 0 in probability. Additionally, we write Xn = Op(an),
to denote that for any positive-valued function ω(n) → ∞, as n → ∞, we have P(|Xn|/an ≥
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ω(n)) = o(1). If En is a measurable subset of Ωn, for any n ∈ N, we say that the sequence
{En}n∈N occurs with high probability (w.h.p.) if P(En) = 1− o(1), as n→∞.
Also we denote by Bin(k, p) denotes a binomially distributed random variable correspond-
ing to the number of successes of a sequence of k independent Bernoulli trials each having
probability of success equal to p.
3.2 Assumptions
Consider a sequence (en, γn)n≥1 of financial networks, indexed by the number of nodes n. Let
mn denote the total number of links in the network en:
mn :=
n∑
i=1
d+n (i) =
n∑
i=1
d−n (i).
The empirical distribution of the degrees is defined by
µn(j, k) :=
1
n
#{i ∈ [n] | d+n (i) = j, d−n (i) = k}.
From now on, we assume that the degree sequences d+n and d
−
n satisfy the following condi-
tions analogous to the ones introduced in [41].
Assumption 3.1. For each n ∈ N, d+n = {(d+n (i))ni=1} and d−n = {(d−n (i))ni=1} are sequences
of non-negative integers with
∑n
i=1 d
+
n (i) =
∑n
i=1 d
−
n (i), and such that for some probability
distribution µ on N20 independent of n and with finite mean λ :=
∑
j,k jµ(j, k) =
∑
j,k kµ(j, k) ∈
(0,∞), the following holds:
1. µn(j, k)→ µ(j, k) for every j, k ≥ 0 as n→∞ ;
2.
∑n
i=1(d
+
n (i))
2 + (d−n (i))2 = O(n).
Note that, in particular the second assumption implies (by uniform integrability) that
mn/n→ λ, as n→∞.
We now present our assumptions on the exposures. Let us denote by Σn(i) the set of
all permutations of the counterparties of i in the network en, i.e., permutations of the set
{j ∈ [n] | en(i, j) > 0}. For the purpose of studying contagion, the role of exposures and
capital ratios may be expressed in terms of default thresholds for each node.
Definition 3.2 (Default threshold). For a node i and permutation τn ∈ Σn(i) which specifies
the order in which i’s counterparties default, the default threshold
Θn(i, τn) := min{k ≥ 0 | γn(i)
n∑
j=1
en(i, j) <
k∑
j=1
(1−R)en(i, τn(j))} (1)
measures how many counterparty defaults i can tolerate before it becomes insolvent (in the
financial network (en, γn)), if its counterparties default in the order specified by τn.
9
We also define
pn(j, k, θ) :=
#{(i, τn) | i ∈ [n], τn ∈ Σn(i), d+n (i) = j, d−n (i) = k, Θn(i, τn) = θ}
nµn(j, k)j!
. (2)
We will see in Section A.2 that for n large, pn(j, k, θ) gives the fraction of nodes with degree
(j, k) which have a default threshold equal to θ, in the random financial network En.
In particular for θ = 1,
nµn(j, k)jpn(j, k, 1)
is the number of exposures of nodes with degree (j, k) which exceed the capital of the exposed
node, i.e., exposures which in case of default of the initial node always lead to the insolvency
of the exposed node. These links play a crucial role (as we will see in Section 3.4) and we call
them contagious links.
Definition 3.3 (Contagious link). We call a link i→ j contagious if it represents an exposure
larger than the capital of the exposed node:
(1−R)en(i, j) > cn(i) = γn(i)
n∑
j=1
en(i, j).
From now on, we assume that pn(j, k, θ) has a limit when n→∞.
Assumption 3.4. There exists a function p : N30 → [0, 1] such that for all j, k, θ ∈ N0 (θ ≤ j)
pn(j, k, θ)→ p(j, k, θ), as n→∞.
Some examples of exposures for which this assumption is fulfilled are given in Section 4.1.
Under this assumption, we will see in Appendix A that p(j, k, θ) is also the limit in probability
of the fraction of nodes with degree (j, k) which become insolvent after θ of their counterparties
default. In particular,
• p(j, k, 0) represents the proportion of initially insolvent nodes with degree (j, k);
• p(j, k, 1) represents the proportion of nodes with degree (j, k) which are ‘vulnerable’, i.e.,
may become insolvent due to the default of a single counterparty.
3.3 The asymptotic magnitude of contagion
Consider a sequence (en, γn)n≥1 of financial networks satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.4, and
let (En, γn)n≥1 be their corresponding sequence of random financial networks, see Definition
2.4. Let us denote by
β(j, pi, θ) := P(Bin(j, pi) ≥ θ) =
j∑
l≥θ
(
j
l
)
pil(1− pi)j−l,
the distribution function of a binomial random variable Bin(j, pi) with parameters j and pi.
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We define the function I : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] as
I(pi) :=
∑
j,k
µ(j, k)k
λ
j∑
θ=0
p(j, k, θ)β(j, pi, θ). (3)
Indeed, I(pi) has the following interpretation (when the network size goes to infinity): If the
end node of a randomly chosen edge defaults with probability pi, I(pi) is the expected fraction
of counterparty defaults after one iteration of the cascade.
Let pi∗ be the smallest fixed point of I in [0, 1], i.e.,
pi∗ = inf{pi ∈ [0, 1] | I(pi) = pi}.
(The value pi∗ represents the probability that an edge taken at random ends in a defaulted
node, at the end of the contagion process.)
Remark 3.5. I admits at least one fixed point. Indeed, I is a continuous increasing function
and,
I(1) =
∑
j,k
µ(j, k)k
λ
j∑
θ=0
p(j, k, θ) ≤ 1
since
∑
θ p(j, k, θ) ≤ 1 by definition. Moreover,
I(0) =
∑
j,k
µ(j, k)k
λ
p(j, k, 0) ≥ 0.
So the function I has at least a fixed point in [0, 1].
We can now announce our main theorem.
Theorem 3.6. Consider a sequence (en, γn)n≥1 of financial networks satisfying Assumptions
3.1 and 3.4, and the corresponding sequence of random matrices (En)n≥1 defined on (Ω,A,P)
as in Definition 2.4. Let pi∗ be the smallest fixed point of I in [0, 1].
1. If pi∗ = 1, i.e., if I(pi) > pi for all pi ∈ [0, 1), then asymptotically almost all nodes default
during the cascades
αn(En, γn)
p→ 1.
2. If pi∗ < 1 and furthermore pi∗ is a stable fixed point of I, i.e., I ′(pi∗) < 1, then the
asymptotic fraction of defaults is given by
αn(En, γn)
p→
∑
j,k
µ(j, k)
j∑
θ=0
p(j, k, θ)β(j, pi∗, θ).
A proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.
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3.4 Resilience to contagion
The resilience of a network to small shocks is a global property of the network which depends
on its detailed structure. However, the above results allow us to introduce a rather simple and
easy to compute indicator for the resilience of a network to small shocks. Consider a sequence
(en, γn)n≥1 of financial networks satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.4.
Definition 3.7 (Network resilience). We define the network resilience function as
1−
∑
j,k
jk
λ
µ(j, k)p(j, k, 1) ∈ (−∞, 1].
The following result, which is a consequence of Theorem 3.6, shows that this indicator
measures the resilience of a network to the initial default of a small fraction ε of the nodes:
Proposition 3.8. Consider a sequence (en, γn)n≥1 of financial networks satisfying Assump-
tions 3.1 and 3.4, and let (En, γn)n≥1 be their corresponding sequence of random financial
networks, see Definition 2.4. If
1−
∑
j,k
jk
λ
µ(j, k)p(j, k, 1) > 0, (4)
then for every ε > 0 there exists Nε and ρε such that, if the initial fraction of defaults is smaller
than ρε then the final fraction of defaults is negligible with high probability:
∀n ≥ Nε, P(αn(En, γn) ≤ ε) > 1− ε.
Proof. Consider ρ be defined as the fraction of fundamental defaults
ρ :=
∑
j,k
µ(j, k)p(j, k, 0).
We have
I(α) =
∑
j,k
µ(j, k)k
λ
j∑
θ=0
p(j, k, θ)β(j, α, θ).
Using a first order expansion of β(j, α, θ) in α at 0 (when α→ 0), we obtain
β(j, α, θ) = 1{θ=0} + αj1{θ=1} + o(α).
Thus,
I(α) =
∑
j,k
µ(j, k)k
λ
(p(j, k, 0) + αjp(j, k, 1)) + o(α).
Let α∗ be the smallest fixed point of I(α). Given Condition (4), for α > 0 and small enough,
we have
lim
ρ→0
I(α) = α
∑
j,k
µ(j, k)jk
λ
p(j, k, 1) + o(α) < α,
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where we used the fact that if the fraction of fundamental defaults tends to zero, so does the
fraction of out-going links belonging to fundamentally defaulted nodes. On the other hand we
have seen that I(0) ≥ 0. Thus limρ→0 α∗ = 0.
Let us now fix ε > 0. By continuity of the function g defined by
g(α) :=
∑
j,k
µ(j, k)
j∑
θ=0
p(j, k, θ)β(j, α, θ),
appearing in Theorem 3.6, there exists ρε such that g(α
∗) < ε/2 as soon as ρ < ρε. By Theorem
3.6 we have that there exists an integer Nε such that, for n ≥ Nε,
P(|αn(En, γn)− g(α∗)| < ε/2) > 1− ε,
which completes the proof.
The proof points out what is a natural and intuitive fact: If contagion does not spread to
nodes with contagion threshold 1, then it will not spread at all.
Theorem 3.9. Consider a sequence (en, γn)n≥1 of financial networks satisfying Assumptions
3.1 and 3.4, and let (En, γn)n≥1 be their corresponding sequence of random financial networks.
If
1−
∑
j,k
µ(j, k)jk
λ
p(j, k, 1) < 0, (5)
then with high probability there exists a set of nodes representing a positive fraction of the finan-
cial system, strongly interlinked by contagious links (i.e., there is a directed path of contagious
links from any node to another in the component), such that any node belonging to this set can
trigger the default of all nodes in the set.
Given the network topology, Condition (4) sets limits on the fraction of contagious links
pn(j, k, 1), i.e., on the magnitude of exposures relative to capital. A proof of this theorem
is given in Appendix A. However, Condition 4 may be justified using the following heuristic
argument.
Remark 3.10 (Branching process approximation). We describe an approximation of the local
structure of the graph by a branching process, the children being the in-coming neighbors: the
root φ with probability µ−(kφ) :=
∑
j µ(j, kφ) has an in-degree equal to kφ. Each of these kφ
vertices with probability µ(j,k)jλ has degree (j, k), and with probability equal to p(j, k, 1) default
when their parent defaults. Let y be the extinction probability, given by the smallest solution
of
y =
∑
j,k
µ(j, k)j
λ
p(j, k, 1)yk. (6)
If
∑
j,k
µ(j,k)jk
λ p(j, k, 1) < 1, then the smallest solution of (6) is y = 1 (the population dies out
with probability one), whereas if ∑
j,k
µ(j, k)jk
λ
p(j, k, 1) > 1,
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there is a unique solution with y ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 3.11 (Too interconnected to fail?). We suppose that the resilience condition (4) is
satisfied. Let pi∗ε be the smallest fixed point of I in [0, 1], when a fraction ε of all nodes represent
fundamental defaults, i.e., p(j, k, 0) = ε for all j, k.
We obtain then, by a first order approximation of the function I, that
pi∗ε =
ε
1−∑j,k µ(j,k)jkλ p(j, k, 1) + o(ε).
By a first order approximation of the function pi → ∑j,k µ(j, k)∑jθ=0 p(j, k, θ)β(j, pi, θ)
giving the asymptotic fraction of defaults in Theorem 3.6, we obtain that, for any ρ there
exists ερ and nρ such that for all ε < ερ and n > nρ
P(|αn(En, γn)− ε(1 +
∑
j,k jµ(j, k)p(j, k, 1)
1−∑j,k µ(j,k)jkλ p(j, k, 1))| < ρ) > 1− ρ. (7)
Suppose now that initially insolvent fraction involves only nodes with degree (d+, d−), and
we denote pi∗ε(d+, d−) the smallest fixed point of I in [0, 1] in the case where p(d+, d−, 0) = ε
and p(j, k, 0) = 0 for all (j, k) 6= (d+, d−). Then we obtain that, for any ρ there exists ερ and
nρ such that for all ε < ερ and n > nρ,
P
(
|αn(En, γn)− εµ(d+, d−)(1 + d
−
λ
∑
j,k
µ(j,k)jk
λ p(j, k, 1)
1−∑j,k µ(j,k)jkλ p(j, k, 1))| < ρ
)
> 1− ρ. (8)
This simple expression shows that there are basically two factors that determine how small
initial shocks are amplified by the financial network: the interconnectedness of the initial
default –represented by its in-degree d−– and the susceptibility of the network, given by the
factor
∑
j,k
µ(j,k)jk
λ p(j, k, 1).
4 Numerical results on finite networks
The results of Section 3 hold in the limit of large network size. In order to assess whether
these results still hold for networks whose size is large but finite, we now compare our theo-
retical results with numerical simulations for networks with realistic sizes. In particular, we
investigate the effect of heterogeneity in network structure and the relation between resilience
and connectivity. We begin by presenting some examples of models for counterparty networks
which satisfy Assumption 3.4.
4.1 Examples of networks which satisfy Assumption 3.4
In this section we give two important examples of exposures which satisfy Assumption 3.4.
Example 4.1 (Independent exposures). Assume that for all n, the exposures of all nodes
i ∈ [n] with the same degree (j, k), i.e.,{
en(i, l) > 0 | d+n (i) = j, d−n (i) = k
}
,
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are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables, with a law given by
FX(j, k), depending on j and k but independent of n. We assume the same for the sequence
of capital ratios, i.e., {γn(i) | d+n (i) = j, d−n (i) = k} are i.i.d. random variables with a law given
by Fγ(j, k) which may depend on (j, k), but not on n. Then it is easy to see that, by the law
of large numbers, Assumption 3.4 holds and the limit p(j, k, θ) is known (for all j, k, θ),
p(j, k, θ) = P(Xθ > γ
j∑
l=1
Xl −
θ−1∑
l=1
(1−R)Xl ≥ 0),
where γ is a random variable with law Fγ(j, k), and (Xl)
j
l=1 are i.i.d. random variables with
law FX(j, k) and independent of γ.
Example 4.2 (Exchangeable exposures). Empirical observations of banking networks [17, 13,
47] show that they are hierarchical, ‘disassortative’ networks [39], with a few large and highly
interconnected dealer banks and many small banks, connected predominantly to dealer banks.
This can be modeled in a stylized way by partitioning the set of nodes into two sets, a set D
of nD dealer banks, and a set N of nN non-dealer banks.
We assume that the exposures {en(i, l) > 0 | i ∈ D}, and {en(i, l) > 0 | i ∈ N} are
restrictions corresponding to the first mDn (respectively m
N
n ) elements of infinite sequences of
exchangeable variables, where mDn and m
N
n denote the total number of exposures belonging
to dealer and respectively non-dealer banks. Similarly, the capital ratios {γn(i) | i ∈ D} and
{γn(i) | i ∈ N} are restrictions to the first nD (respectively nN ) elements of the sequence,
independent of the sequence of exposures.
We can extend this example to a finite number of classes of nodes represented by their
degrees, and also drop the assumption of independence between exposures and capital ratios.
We assume that within each class, the sequence of a node’s exposures and capital ratios are
exchangeable random variables.
For each node i with d+n (i) = j, d
−
n (i) = k, we let
Yn(i) := ({en(i, j) > 0}, γn(i))
be a multivariate random variable with state space =j,k ⊂ Rj+⊗R. We assume that the law of
the finite sequence {
Yn(i) | i ∈ [n], d+n (i) = j, d−n (i) = k
}
is invariant under permutation.
Then the family {Yn(i) | i ∈ [n], d+n (i) = j, d−n (i) = k}0≤j,k≤M represents a family of finite
multi-exchangeable systems, as defined by Graham [23]. It is proved in [23] that the conditional
law of a finite multiclass system, given the value of the vector of the empirical measures of its
classes, corresponds to independent uniform orderings of the samples within each class, and that
a family of such systems converges in law if and only if the corresponding empirical measure
vectors converge in law.
Let us consider the empirical measure sequence{
Λj,kn :=
∑
i 1{ d+n (i)=j, d−n (i)=k}δYn(i)
nµn(j, k)
}
0≤j,k≤M
.
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We suppose that the family {Yn(i) | i ∈ [n], d+n (i) = j, d−n (i) = k}0≤j,k≤M converges in law
when n→∞ to an infinite multi-exchangeable system
lim
n→∞
{
Yn(i) | i ∈ [n], d+n (i) = j, d−n (i) = k
}
0≤j,k≤M
L
=
{
Zj,kl | l ≥ 1
}
0≤j,k≤M
. (9)
By [23, Theorem 2], the empirical measure converges in law to
lim
n→∞
{
Λj,kn
}
0≤j,k≤M
L
=
{
Λj,k
}
0≤j,k≤M
. (10)
For an arbitrary Z ∈ =j,k, we define the function
h(Z, θ) =
#{τ | τ ∈ Σ(j),Θ(Z, τ) = θ}
j!
.
Thus, by Equation (10) giving the convergence of empirical measures and, the fact that the
function h is bounded, we have
pn(j, k, θ) = EΛ
j,k
n (h(Z, θ))
n→∞→ EΛj,k(h(Z, θ)) = p(j, k, θ),
with Z a random element of =j,k and EΛj,kn and EΛj,k denoting expectation under the measures
Λj,kn and Λj,k respectively. A last observation is that Equation (9) is verified in our two tiered
example since the sequences of exposures in the network of size n are restrictions of infinite
exchangeable sequences.
4.2 Relevance of asymptotics
Interbank networks in developed countries may contain several thousands of nodes. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation insured 7969 institutions as of 3/18/2010, while the European
Central Bank reports 8350 monetary financial institutions in the Euro zone (80% credit in-
stitutions and 20% money market funds). To assess the relevance of asymptotic formulae for
studying contagion in networks with such sizes, we generate a scale-free network of 10000 nodes
with Pareto distributed exposures using the random graph model introduced by Blanchard [11],
which can be seen as a static version of the preferential attachment model. In this model, given
the sequence of out-degrees, an arbitrary out-going edge is assigned to an end-node i with
probability proportional to the power d+n (i)
α where α > 0. This leads to positive correlation
between in-degrees and out-degrees.
The distribution of the out-degree in this model is a Pareto law with tail exponent γ+:
µ+n (j) := #{i | d+n (i) = j} n→∞→ µ+(j) ∼ jγ
++1,
and the conditional limit law of the in-degree is a Poisson distribution
P (d− = k|d+ = j) = e−λ(j)λ(j)
k
k!
,
with λ(j) = j
αE(D+)
E((D+)α) , where D
+ denotes a random variable with law µ+. The main theorem
in [11] states that the marginal distribution of the in-degree has a Pareto tail with exponent
γ− = γ
+
α , provided 1 ≤ α < γ+.
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In the sequel we investigate cascades on these finite networks. A crucial ingredient is the
capital ratio of each bank. Throughout this section, the capital ratio is assumed to be bounded
from below by a minimal capital ratio and, we consider the worst case scenario where all
nodes have a capital ratio equal to the minimal capital ratio: γ(i) = γmin, ∀i ∈ V.
The distribution of this simulated network’s degrees and exposures is given in Figure 1 and
is based on the empirical analysis of the Brazilian network in June 2007 [17].
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Figure 1: (a) The distribution of out-degree has a Pareto tail with exponent 2.19, (b) The
distribution of the in-degree has a Pareto tail with exponent 1.98, (c) The distribution of the
exposures (tail-exponent 2.61).
On one hand we make a simulation of the default contagion starting with a random set
of defaults representing 0.1% of all nodes (chosen uniformly among all nodes). On the other
hand we plug the empirical distribution of the degrees and the fraction of contagious links
into Equation (7) for the amplification of a small number of initial defaults. Figure 2 plots
the amplification for varying values of the minimal capital ratios. We find a good agreement
between the theoretical and the simulated default amplification ratios. We can clearly see that
for minimal capital ratios γmin less than the critical value γ
∗
min, the amplification ratio increases
dramatically.
Figure 3 plots the simulated fraction of defaults in a scale free network, starting from the
initial default of a single node, as a function of the in-degree of the defaulting node, versus the
theoretical slope given in Equation (8). Recall that the theoretical slope
∑
j,k
µ(j,k)jk
λ p(j, k, 1)
in Equation (8) measures the susceptibility of the network to initial defaults.
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Figure 2: Amplification of the number of defaults in a Scale-Free Network. The in- and
out-degree of the scale-free network are Pareto distributed with tail coefficients 2.19 and 1.98
respectively, the exposures are Pareto distributed with tail coefficient 2.61, n = 10000.
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The agreement is particularly good for nodes with large in-degrees, pointing to large am-
plification if such nodes were to default in a network with high susceptibility.
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Figure 3: Number of defaulted nodes
4.3 The impact of heterogeneity
In the previous examples we can compute the minimal capital ratio γ∗min above which the
network is resilient under Condition (4). Two factors contribute to the sum in Condition (4):
connectivity of the node, and its fraction of contagious links. We compare in Figure 4, the
ratio by which contagion amplifies the number of initial default in three cases: a scale free
network with heterogeneous weights (exposures), a scale free network with equal weights and a
‘homogeneous’ random network (the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph where every directed edge is
present with a fixed probability) with equal weights. All three networks are parameterized to
have the same average degree, i.e., the same total number of links. It is interesting to note that
in our example the most heterogeneous network is also the least resilient, as opposed to the
homogeneous Erdo¨s–Re´nyi network with the same distribution of exposures. These simulations
corroborate the role played both by the network topology and the heterogeneity of weights.
4.4 Average connectivity and contagion
One of the recurrent questions in the economics literature regards the impact of connectivity
on resilience to contagion: Is increased global connectivity posing a threat to financial system
or does it allow for more efficient risk sharing? While an influential paper by Allen and Gale
[1] finds that resilience increases with connectivity, Battiston et al. [10] exhibit different model
settings where this relation is non-monotonous. Our results show nonetheless that in a model
with heterogenous exposures, the average connectivity is too simple summary statistic of the
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Figure 4: Amplification of the number of defaults in a Scale-Free Network (in- and out-degree
of the scale-free network are Pareto distributed with tail coefficients 2.19 and 1.98 respectively,
the exposures are Pareto distributed with tail coefficient 2.61), the same network with equal
weights and an Erdo¨s Re´nyi Network with equal exposures n = 10000.
topology to be explain resilience. To see this let us consider a simple example and use the
asymptotic formula (7) for the amplification.
For simplicity, consider networks in which nodes’ exposures are equal and 1/3 ≤ γmin < 1/2
such that pn(j, k, θ) = 1{j=1,2}. We consider three cases of degree distributions.
First, let µn(1, 3) = µn(2, 3) = µn(4, 3) = µn(5, 3) = 1/4. The average connectivity in a
network with this degree distribution is 3 and the resilience measure is equal to 1/4.
Second, let µ˜n(1, 2) = 2/3, µ˜n(4, 2) = 1/3. The average connectivity is 2 and the resilience
measure is equal to 1/3.
Last, we take µˆn(4, 4) = 1 i.e., a regular graph with degree 4. Here the average connectivity
is 4 and the resilience measure is 1.
In all three cases a network constructed with the empirical degree distribution is resilient
w.h.p.. Nonetheless, we clearly observe that the resilience measure does not depend on the
average connectivity in a monotonous way.
While in the case of [10] this non-monotonicity is obtained by introducing an ad-hoc mech-
anism of ‘financial accelerators’ on top of the network contagion effects, in our case it stems
from an intrinsic trade-off between risk-sharing and contagion which is inherent in the model.
These examples show that the resilience of a network cannot be simply assessed by exam-
ining an aggregate measure of connectivity such as the average degree or the number of links,
as sometimes naively suggested in the literature, but requires a closer examination of features
such as the distribution of degrees and the structure of the subgraph of contagious links.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed distress propagation in a financial system where banks strongly
differ in local features, and links between financial institutions are heterogenous in nature.
We obtained an asymptotic expression for the size of a default cascade in a large network
with prescribed characteristics –degree sequence and local features of the nodes– extending pre-
vious results for homogeneous undirected random graphs to heterogeneous, weighted directed
networks.
Our asymptotic results were corroborated with a simulation study of contagion on a network
with large but realistic size: on a given network, the spread of distress can be predicted by
our measure of resilience. Our sample network has the same empirical properties as a real
interbank network, e.g., the Brazilian one. As we vary the capital ratio, the point where
the resilience measure becomes negative, or otherwise said where the theoretical amplification
explodes, closely predicts the point where a large cascade would ensue. This illustrates how one,
given an interbank network, could use the resilience measure and the theoretical amplification
as a supervisory tool. This point is further developed in our follow-up paper on stress testing
[4].
The crucial question in the context of macro prudential regulation of banking systems is
how to identify and mitigate those features that make nodes systemically important. We have
identified institutions acting as potential hubs for default contagion as those highly connected
and with a large fraction of contagious links. One natural way to mitigate the systemic impact
of these nodes is to set minimal capital requirements with respect to contagious links. This
point of view is different from the current capital requirements as defined by the Basel II
accords. Currently, minimal capital depends on the risk weighted sum of exposures, where the
risk weights are given by the counterparty default probability. However, the default probability
is computed by internal models and may not take into account knock-on effects. Our results
suggest that, for financial stability, minimal ratios of capital should be set with respect to
contagious exposures.
While the insolvency contagion investigated in this paper has been mostly associated with
balance-sheet contagion, our results may be applied to players in the over-the-counter deriva-
tives markets. Contagion is carried in these markets through intermediaries with a large fraction
of critical receivables defined similarly to contagious links, i.e., receivables on which the inter-
mediary depends to meet its own payment obligations [16]. We argue that financial stability
would be significantly enhanced by setting lower bounds on liquid reserves with respect to
critical receivables, for those nodes which are counterparties to a large number of contracts.
Last, whereas in this paper we were concerned mostly with a network where the node’s
characteristics were observable, our results apply to the particular case where connectivities and
weights are sequences of (exchangeable) random variables with arbitrary correlation structure.
This corresponds to a setting where the modeler cannot observe the sequence of exposures,
but rather has some belief over their distribution. Such a perspective would have for example
a market participant who models the default probability of its counterparties and takes into
consideration network effets.
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A Appendix: Proofs
In this section we present the proofs of Theorem 3.6 and 3.8. We begin by introducing a
weighted configuration model –a multigraph related to the financial network– which has the
same asymptotic behavior as the random financial network. We then show by a coupling
argument that the default cluster in the weighted configuration model can be constructed
sequentially. The contagion process in this sequential model may then be described by a
Markov chain. We then generalize the differential equation method of Wormald [51] to the case
where the dimension of the Markov chain depends on size of the network and we show that,
as the network size increases, the rescaled Markov chain converges in probability to a limit
described by a system of ordinary differential equations. We solve these equations and obtain
an analytical result on the final fraction of defaults in the network. Finally, we show that, if
the resilience measure is negative, the skeleton of contagious links percolates.
Consider a sequence (en, γn)n≥1 of financial networks satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.4.
A.1 Link with the configuration model
A standard method for studying random graphs with prescribed degree sequence is to consider
(see e.g., [12, 41, 29]) a related random multigraph with the same degree sequence, known as the
configuration model [12], then condition on this multigraph being simple. The configuration
model in the case of random directed graphs has been studied by Cooper and Frieze [18].
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Figure 5: Configuration model
Proceeding analogously, we introduce a multigraph with the same degrees and exposures as
the network defined above, but which is easier to study because of the independence properties
of the variables involved. Conditioned on being a simple graph, it has the same law as the
random financial network defined above.
Definition A.1 (Configuration model). Given a set of nodes [n] = {1, . . . , n} and a degree
sequence (d+n ,d
−
n ), we associate to each node i two sets: H
+
n (i) representing its out-going half-
edges and H−n (i) representing its in-coming half-edges, with |H+n (i)| = d+n (i) and |H−n (i)| =
d−n (i). Let H+n =
⋃
iH
+
n (i) and H
−
n =
⋃
iH
−
n (i). A configuration is a matching of H
+
n with H
−
n .
To each configuration we assign a graph. When an out-going half-edge of node i is matched
with an in-coming half-edge of node j, a directed edge from i to j appears in the graph. The
configuration model is the random directed multigraph G∗n(en) which is uniformly distributed
across all configurations (Figure 5).
It is easy to see that, conditional on being a simple graph, G∗n(en) is uniformly distributed
on Gn(en). Thus, the law of G∗n(en) conditional on being a simple graph is the same as the law
of En.
In particular any property that holds with high probability (with probability tending to
1 as n → ∞) for the random multigraph G∗n(en), holds with high probability on the random
network En provided
lim inf
n→∞ P(G
∗
n(en) is simple) > 0. (11)
In particular, the condition
∑n
i=1(d
+
n (i))
2 + (d−n (i))2 = O(n) implies (11), see [30].
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Remark A.2. Janson [30] has studied, in the case of undirected graphs, the probability of the
random multigraph to be simple. One can adapt the proof to the directed case and show that
the condition
∑n
i=1(d
+
n (i))
2 + (d−n (i))2 = O(n) implies (11). Indeed, in the non-directed case,
Janson [30] proves that when mn :=
∑n
i=1 dn(i)→∞, (dn(i) is the degree of node i) one has
P(G∗(n, (dn(i))n1 ) is simple) = exp
−1
2
∑
i
λii −
∑
i<j
(λij − log(1 + λij))
+ o(1),
where for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n; λij :=
√
dn(i)(dn(i)−1)dn(j)(dn(j)−1)
mn
. The proof of these results is based on
counting vertices with at least one loop and, pairs of vertices with at least two edges between
them, disregarding the number of parallel loops or edges. The same argument applies to the
directed case, and one can show that when mn :=
∑n
i=1 d
+
n (i) =
∑n
i=1 d
−
n (i)→∞, then
P(G∗n(en) is simple) = exp
−1
2
∑
i
λii −
∑
i<j
(λij − log(1 + λij))
+ o(1),
where for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n; λij =
√
d+n (i)d
−
n (i)d
+
n (j)d
−
n (j)
mn
.
One can observe that a uniform matching of half-edges can be obtained sequentially: choose
an in-coming half-edge according to any rule (random or deterministic), and then choose the
corresponding out-going half-edge uniformly over the unmatched out-going half-edges. The
configuration model is thus particularly appropriate for the study of contagion, as we will see
in the proofs, since we can restrict the matching process to choosing only in-coming half-edges
entering defaulted nodes. In doing so, one constructs directly the contagion cluster in the
random graph given by the configuration model and endowed with the sequence of capital
ratios.
Due to this property, it is easier to study contagion on G∗n(en) under conditions on the
degree sequence for the assumption above (11) to hold, then translate all results holding with
high probability to the initial network En defined in Definition 2.4.
A.2 Coupling
We are given the set of nodes [n] and their sequence of degrees (d+n ,d
−
n ). For each node i, we
fix an indexing of its out-going and in-coming half-edges, ranging in [d+n (i)] = {1, . . . , d+n (i)}
and [d−n (i)] respectively. Furthermore, all out-going half-edges are given a global label in the
range [1, . . . ,mn], with mn the total number of out-going (in-coming) half-edges. Similarly, all
in-coming half-edges are given a global label in the range [mn].
Recall that Σn(i) denotes the set of all permutations of the counterparties of i in the network
en. The set of weights on the links exiting node i is given by
Wn(i) := {en(i, j) > 0}. (12)
For the sequence of edge weights and capital ratios, (en, γn), we generate the random graph
G˜n(en, γn), by the following algorithm:
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1. For each node i, choose a permutation τ in ∈ Σn(i) uniformly at random among all per-
mutations of node i’s out-going half edges.
2. Color all in-coming and out-going half-edges in black. Define the set of initially defaulted
nodes
D0 :=
⋃
i,γn(i)=0
{i}.
Set for all nodes i ∈ [n]\D0; c(i) = γn(i)
∑
j∈[n] en(i, j).
3. At step k ≥ 1, if the set of in-coming black half-edges belonging to nodes in Dk−1 is
empty, denote Df the set Dk−1. Otherwise:
(a) Choose among all in-coming black half-edges of the nodes in Dk−1 the in-coming
half-edge with the lowest global label and color it in red.
(b) Choose a node i with probability proportional to its number of black out-going half-
edges and set pin(k) = i. Let i have l−1 out-going half-edges colored in red. Choose
its τ in(l)-th out-going half-edge and color it in red. Let its weight be w. If the node
i /∈ Dk−1 and (1 − R)w is larger than i’s remaining capital then Dk = Dk−1
⋃{i}.
Otherwise, the capital of node i becomes c(i)− (1−R)w.
(c) Match node i’s τ in(l)-th out-going half-edge to the in-coming half-edge selected at
step (3a) to form an edge.
4. Choose a random uniform matching of the remaining out-going half-edges and match
them to the remaining in-coming half-edges in increasing order and color them all in red.
Lemma A.3. The random graph G˜n(en, γn) has the same distribution as G
∗
n(en). Furthermore
the set Df at the end of the above algorithm is the final set of defaulted nodes in the graph
G˜n(en, γn) (endowed with capital ratios γn).
Proof. The second claim is trivial. Let us prove the first claim. For a set A, we denote by ΣA
the set of permutations of A. Let σ+n and σ
−
n be the random permutations in Σ[mn], representing
the order in which the above algorithm selects the in-coming / out-going edges. At step k of
the above construction, in-coming half-edge with global label σ−n (k) is matched to out-going
half-edge with global label σ+n (k) to form an edge. The permutation σ
+
n is determined by
the set of permutations (τ in)i=1,...,n and the sequence pin of size mn, representing the (ordered)
sequence of nodes selected at Step 3b (or Step 4 when the set of in-coming black half-edges
belonging to nodes in Dk−1 is empty - assume we choose sequentially uniformly at random) of
the algorithm (each node i appears in sequence pin exactly d
+
n (i) times).
It is easy to see that σ+n is a uniform permutation among all permutations in Σ[mn], since
(τ in)i=1,...,n are uniformly distributed and at each step of the algorithm we choose a node with
probability proportional to its black out-going half-edges. On the other hand, the value of
σ−n (k) depends in a deterministic manner on
(en, γn, σ
+
n (1), . . . , σ
+
n (k − 1)).
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The out-going half-edge with global label j is matched with the in-coming half-edge with
global label (σ−n ◦ (σ+n )−1)(j). In order to prove our claim it is enough to prove that the
permutation (σ−n ◦ (σ+n )−1) is uniformly distributed among all permutations of mn. Indeed, for
an arbitrary permutation ξ belonging to the set Σ[mn], we have that
P
(
σ+n (j) = ξ
−1(σ−n (j))| σ+n (k) = ξ−1(σ−n (k)) for all k < j
)
=
1
mn − j + 1 .
Indeed, conditional on the knowledge of (σ+n (1), . . . , σ
+
n (j−1)), σ−n (j) is deterministic. Also, by
conditioning on ∀k < j, σ+n (k) = ξ−1(σ−n (k)), then ξ−1(σ−n (j)) ∈ T := [mn]\{σ+n (1), . . . , σ+n (j−
1)}, of cardinal mn − j + 1. In the above algorithm, σ+n (j) has uniform law over T . Then the
probability to choose ξ−1(σ−n (j)) is
1
mn−j+1 .
By the law of iterated expectations, we obtain that
P(σ−n ◦ (σ+n )−1 = ξ) = P(σ+n = ξ−1 ◦ σ−n ) =
1
mn!
.
This and the fact that the last step of the algorithm is a conditionally uniform match conclude
the proof.
We can find the final set of defaulted nodes Df of the above algorithm in the following
manner: once the permutation τ in is chosen, assign to each node its corresponding threshold
θn(i) = Θn(i, τ
i
n) as in Definition 3.2, and forget everything about (en, γn).
Definition A.4. Denote by G˜n(d
+
n ,d
−
n , θn) the random graph resulting from the above algo-
rithm, in which we replace Step 3b of the algorithm by the fact that node i defaults the first
time it has θn(i) out-going half-edges colored in red, i.e., at step
inf{k ≥ 1, such that θn(i) = #{1 ≤ l ≤ k, pin(l) = i}}.
Corollary A.5. The random graph G˜n(d
+
n ,d
−
n , θn) has the same law as the unweighted skeleton
of G˜n(en, γn).
Let Nn(j, k, θ) denote the number of nodes with degree (j, k) and threshold θ after choosing
uniformly the random permutations τn in the above construction.
Lemma A.6. We have (as n→∞)
Nn(j, k, θ)
n
p→ µ(j, k)p(j, k, θ).
Proof. For any node i with with degree (j, k), the probability that its default threshold Θn(i, τ
i
n)
be equal to θ is
νn(i, θ) :=
#{τ ∈ Σn(i) | Θn(i, τ) = θ}
j!
.
Then we have
Nn(j, k, θ) =
∑
i, d+n (i)=j, d
−
n (i)=k
Be(νn(i, θ)),
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where Be(·) denotes a Bernoulli variable. By Assumption 3.4 we have
E[Nn(j, k, θ)/n] = µn(j, k)pn(j, k, θ)
n→∞→ µ(j, k)p(j, k, θ),
and Var[Nn(j, k, θ)/n] =
∑
i, d+n (i)=j, d
−
n (i)=k
νn(i, θ)(1− νn(i, θ))
n2
n→∞→ 0.
Now it is easy to conclude the proof by Chebysev’s inequality.
A.3 A Markov chain description of contagion dynamics
In the previous section, we have replaced the description based on default rounds by an equiv-
alent one based on successive bilateral interactions. By interaction we mean matching an
in-coming edge with an out-going edge. At each step of the algorithm described in last section,
we have one interaction only between two nodes (banks), yielding at most one default. This
allows for a simpler Markov chain which leads to the same set of final defaults.
We describe now the contagion process on the unweighted graph G˜n(d
+
n ,d
−
n , θn) with thresh-
olds (θn(i) = Θn(i, τ
i
n))1≤i≤n in terms of the dynamics of a Markov chain.
At each iteration we partition the nodes according to their state of solvency, degree, thresh-
old and number of defaulted neighbors. Let us define Sj,k,θ,ln (t), the number of solvent banks
with degree (j, k), default threshold θ and l defaulted debtors before time t. We introduce the
additional variables of interest:
• Dj,k,θn (t): the number of defaulted banks at time t with degree (j, k) and default threshold
θ,
• Dn(t): the number of defaulted banks at time t,
• D−n (t): the number of black in-coming edges belonging to defaulted banks,
for which it is easy to see that the following identities hold:
Dj,k,θn (t) = µn(j, k)pn(j, k, θ)−
∑
0≤l<θ
Sj,k,θ,ln (t),
D−n (t) =
∑
j,k,0≤θ≤j
kDj,k,θn (t)− t,
Dn(t) =
∑
j,k,0≤θ≤j
Dj,k,θn (t).
Because at each step we color in red one out-going edge and the number of black out-going
edges at time 0 is mn, the number of black out-going edges at time t will be mn − t .
By construction, Yn(t) =
(
Sj,k,θ,ln (t)
)
j,k,0≤l<θ≤j
represents a Markov chain. Let (Fn,t)t≥0
be its natural filtration. We define the operator ∧ as
x ∧ y = max(x, y).
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The length of the default cascade is given by
Tn = inf{0 ≤ t ≤ mn, D−n (t) = 0} ∧mn, (13)
The total number of defaults is given by Dn(Tn), which represents the cardinal of the final set
of defaulted nodes.
Let us now describe the transition probabilities of the Markov chain. For t < Tn, there are
three possibilities for the partner B of an in-coming edge of a defaulted node A at time t+ 1:
1. B is in default, the next state is Yn(t+ 1) = Yn(t).
2. B is solvent, has degree (j, k) and default threshold θ and this is the (l + 1)-th deleted
out-going edge and l + 1 < θ. The probability of this event is (j−l)S
j,k,θ,l
n (t)
mn−t . The changes
for the next state will be
Sj,k,θ,ln (t+ 1) = S
j,k,θ,l
n (t)− 1,
Sj,k,θ,l+1n (t+ 1) = S
j,k,θ,l+1
n (t) + 1.
3. B is solvent, has degree (j, k) and default threshold θ and this is the θ-th deleted out-going
edge. Then with probability (j−θ+1)S
j,k,θ,θ−1
n (t)
mn−t we have
Sj,k,θ,θ−1n (t+ 1) = S
j,k,θ,θ−1
n (t)− 1.
Let ∆t be the difference operator: ∆tY := Y (t+ 1)− Y (t). We obtain the following equations
for the expectation of Yn(t+1), conditional on Fn,t, by averaging over the possible transitions:
E
[
∆tS
j,k,θ,0
n |Fn,t
]
= −jS
j,k,θ,0
n (t)
mn − t ,
E
[
∆tS
j,k,θ,l
n |Fn,t
]
=
(j − l + 1)Sj,k,θ,l−1n (t)
mn − t −
(j − l)Sj,k,θ,ln (t)
mn − t . (14)
The initial condition is
Sj,k,θ,ln (0) = Nn(j, k, θ)1(l = 0)1(0 < θ ≤ j).
Remark A.7. We are interested in the value of Dn(Tn), with Tn defined in (13). In case
Tn < mn, the Markov chain can still be well defined for t ∈ [Tn,mn) by the same transition
probabilities. However, after Tn it will no longer be related to the contagion process and the
value D−n (t), representing for t ≤ Tn the number of in-coming half-edges belonging to defaulted
banks, becomes negative. We consider from now on that the above transition probabilities hold
for t < mn.
We will show in the next section that the trajectory of these variables for t ≤ Tn is close to
the solution of the deterministic differential equations suggested by equations (14) with high
probability.
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A.4 A law of large numbers for the contagion process
Define the following set of differential equations denoted by (DE):
(sj,k,θ,0)′(τ) = −js
j,k,θ,0(τ)
λ− τ ,
(sj,k,θ,l)′(τ) =
(j − l + 1)sj,k,θ,l−1(τ)
λ− τ −
(j − l)sj,k,θ,l(τ)
λ− τ , (DE),
with initial conditions
sj,k,θ,l(0) = µ(j, k)p(j, k, θ)1(l = 0)1(0 < θ ≤ j).
Lemma A.8. The system of differential equations (DE) admits the unique solution
y(τ) :=
(
sj,k,θ,l(τ)
)
j,k,0≤l<θ≤j
,
in the interval 0 ≤ τ < λ, with
sj,k,θ,l(τ) := µ(j, k)p(j, k, θ)
(
j
l
)
(1− τ
λ
)j−l(
τ
λ
)l1{0<θ≤j}. (15)
Proof. We denote by DEK the set of differential equations defined above, restricted to j∧k < K
and by b(K) the dimension of the restricted system. Since the derivatives of the functions(
sj,k,θ,l(τ)
)
j∧k<K,0≤l<θ≤j depend only on τ and the same functions, by a standard result in the
theory of ordinary differential equations [27, Ch.2, Thm 11], there is an unique solution of DEK
in any domain of the type (−ε, λ)×R, with R a bounded subdomain of Rb(K) and ε > 0. The
solution of (DE) is defined to be the set of functions solving all the finite systems (DEK)K≥1.
We solve now the system DE. Let u = u(τ) = −ln(λ − τ). Then u(0) = −ln(λ), u is
strictly monotone and so is the inverse function τ = τ(u). We write the system of differential
equations (DE) with respect to u:
(sj,k,θ,0)′(u) = −jsj,k,θ,0(u),
(sj,k,θ,l)′(u) = (j − l + 1)sj,k,θ,l−1(u)− (j − l)sj,k,θ,l(u).
Then we have
d
du
(sj,k,θ,l+1e(j−l−1)(u−u(0))) = (j − l)sj,k,θ,l(u)e(j−l−1)(u−u(0)),
and by induction, we find
sj,k,θ,l(u) = e−(j−l)(u−u(0))
l∑
r=0
(
j − r
l − r
)(
1− e−(u−u(0))
)l−r
sj,k,θ,r(u(0)).
By going back to τ , we have
sj,k,θ,l(τ) = (1− τ
λ
)j−l
l∑
r=0
sj,k,θ,r(0)
(
j − r
l − r
)
(
τ
λ
)l−r.
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Then, by using the initial conditions, we find
sj,k,θ,l(τ) = µ(j, k)p(j, k, θ)
(
j
l
)
(1− τ
λ
)j−l(
τ
λ
)l1{θ>0}.
A key idea is to approximate, following Wormald [51], the Markov chain by the solution of
a system of differential equations in the large network limit [51, 41]. We summarize here the
main result of [51].
For a set of variables Y 1, ..., Y b and for U ⊂ Rb+1, define the stopping time TU = TU (Y 1, ..., Y b) =
inf{t ≥ 1, (t/n;Y 1(t)/n, ..., Y b(t)/n) /∈ U}.
Lemma A.9 ( Theorem 5.1. in [51]). Let b ≥ 2 be an integer and consider a sequence of real
valued random variables ({Y ln(t)}1≤l≤b)t≥0 and its natural filtration Fn,t. Assume that there is
a constant C0 > 0 such that |Y ln(t)| ≤ C0n for all n, t ≥ 0 and 1 ≤ l ≤ b. For all l ≥ 1 let
fl : Rb+1 → R be functions and assume that for some bounded connected open set U ⊆ Rb+1
containing the closure of
{(0, z1, ..., zb) : ∃ n such that P(∀ 1 ≤ l ≤ b, Y ln(0) = zln) 6= 0},
the following three conditions are verified:
1. (Boundedness). For some function β(n) ≥ 1 we have for all t < TU
max
1≤l≤b
|Y ln(t+ 1)− Y ln(t)| ≤ β(n).
2. (Trend). There exists λ1(n) = o(1) such that for 1 ≤ l ≤ b and t < TU
|E[Y ln(t+ 1)− Y ln(t)|Fn,t]− fl(t/n, Y 1n (t)/n, ..., Y ln(t)/n)| ≤ λ1(n).
3. (Lipschitz). The functions (fl)1≤l≤b are Lipschitz-continuous on U .
Then the following conclusions hold:
(a) For (0, zˆ1, ..., zˆb) ∈ U , the system of differential equations
dzl
ds
= fl(s, z1, ..., zl), l = 1, ..., b,
has a unique solution in U , zl : R→ R, which passes through zl(0) = zˆl, for l = 1, . . . , b,
and which extends to points arbitrarily close to the boundary of U .
(b) Let λ > λ1(n) with λ = o(1). For a sufficiently large constant C, with probability 1 −
O
(
bβ(n)
λ exp
(
− nλ3
β(n)3
))
, we have
sup
0≤t≤σ(n)n
(Y ln(t)− nzln(t/n)) = O(λn),
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where zn(t) = (z
1
n(t), . . . , z
b
n(t)) is the solution of
dzn
dt
= f(t, zn(t)) zn(0) = Yn(0)/n
and σ(n) = sup{t ≥ 0, d∞(zn(t), ∂U) ≥ Cλ}.
We apply this lemma to the contagion model described in Section A.3. Let us define, for
0 ≤ τ ≤ λ
δj,k,θ(τ) := µ(j, k)p(j, k, θ)−
∑
0≤l<θ
sj,k,θ,l(τ),
δ−(τ) :=
∑
j,k,θ
kδj,k,θ(τ)− τ, and
δ(τ) :=
∑
j,k,θ
δj,k,θ(τ),
with sj,k,θ,l given in Lemma A.8. With Bin(j, pi) denoting a binomial variable with parameters
j and pi, we have
δj,k,θ(τ) = µ(j, k)p(j, k, θ)P
(
Bin(j,
τ
λ
) ≥ θ
)
, (16)
δ−(τ) =
∑
j,k,θ
kδj,k,θ(τ)− τ
=
∑
j,k,θ≤j
kµ(j, k)p(j, k, θ)P
(
Bin(j,
τ
λ
) ≥ θ
)
− τ (17)
= λ(I(
τ
λ
)− τ
λ
),
and
δ(τ) :=
∑
j,k,0≤θ≤j
µ(j, k)p(j, k, θ)P
(
Bin(j,
τ
λ
) ≥ θ
)
. (18)
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3.6
We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 3.6 whose aim is to approximate the value Dn(Tn)/n
as n→∞. We base the proof on Theorem A.9. However, several difficulties arise since in our
case since the number of variables depends on n. We first need to bound the contribution of
higher order terms in the infinite sums (17) and (18). Fix ε > 0. By Condition 3.1, we know
λ =
∑
j,k
kµ(j, k) =
∑
j,k
jµ(j, k) ∈ (0,∞).
Then, there exists an integer Kε, such that∑
k≥Kε
∑
j
kµ(j, k) +
∑
j≥Kε
∑
k
jµ(j, k) < ε,
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which implies that ∑
j∧k≥Kε
kµ(j, k) < ε.
It follows that
∀ 0 ≤ τ ≤ λ,
∑
j∧k≥Kε,0≤θ≤j
kµ(j, k)p(j, k, θ)P
(
Bin(j,
τ
λ
) ≥ θ
)
< ε. (19)
The number of vertices with degree (j, k) is nµn(j, k). Again, by Condition 3.1,∑
j,k
kµn(j, k) =
∑
j,k
jµn(j, k)→ λ ∈ (0,∞).
Therefore, for n large enough,
∑
j∧k≥Kε kµn(j, k) < ε, and
∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ mn,
∑
j∧k≥Kε,0≤θ≤j
kDj,k,θn (t)/n < ε. (20)
For K ≥ 1, we denote
yK :=
(
sj,k,θ,l(τ)
)
j∧k<K, 0≤l<θ≤j
and
Y Kn :=
(
Sj,k,θ,ln (τ)
)
j∧k<K, 0≤l<θ≤j
,
both of dimension b(K), where δj,k,θ(τ), sj,k,θ,l(τ) are solutions to a system (DE) of ordinary
differential equations. Let
pi∗ = min{pi ∈ [0, 1]|I(pi) = pi}.
For the arbitrary constant ε > 0 we fixed above, we define the domain Uε as
Uε = {
(
τ, yKε
) ∈ Rb(Kε)+1 : −ε < τ < λ− ε , −ε < sj,k,θ,l < 1}. (21)
The domain Uε is a bounded open set which contains the support of all initial values of the
variables. Each variable is bounded by a constant times n (C0 = 1). By the definition of our
process, the Boundedness condition is satisfied with β(n) = 1. The second condition of the
theorem is satisfied by some λ1(n) = O(1/n). Finally the Lipschitz property is also satisfied
since λ − τ is bounded away from zero. Then by Lemma A.9 and by using Lemma A.6 for
convergence of initial conditions, we have :
Corollary A.10. For a sufficiently large constant C, we have
P(∀t ≤ nσC(n),YKεn (t) = nyKε(t/n) +O(n3/4)) = 1−O(b(Kε)n−1/4exp(−n−1/4)) (22)
uniformly for all t ≤ nσC(n) where
σC(n) = sup{τ ≥ 0, d(yKε(τ), ∂Uε ) ≥ Cn−1/4}.
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When the solution reaches the boundary of Uε, it violates the first constraint in 21, determined
by τˆ = λ− ε. By convergence of mnn to λ, there is a value n0 such that ∀n ≥ n0, mnn > λ− ε,
which ensures that τˆn ≤ mn. Using (19) and (20), we have, for 0 ≤ t ≤ nτˆ and n ≥ n0:∣∣D−n (t)/n− δ−(t/n)∣∣ = |∑
j,k
∑
θ≤j
k(Dj,k,θn (t)/n− δj,k,θ(t/n))|
≤
∑
j,k
∑
θ≤j
k
∣∣∣Dj,k,θn (t)/n− δj,k,θ(t/n)∣∣∣
≤
∑
j∧k≤Kε
∑
θ≤j
k
∣∣∣Dj,k,θn (t)/n− δj,k,θ(t/n)∣∣∣+ 2ε, (23)
and
|Dn(t)/n− δ(t/n)| ≤
∑
j∧k≤Kε
∑
θ≤j
∣∣∣Dj,k,θn (t)/n− δj,k,θ(t/n)∣∣∣+ 2ε, (24)
We obtain by Corollary A.10 that
sup
t≤τˆn
∣∣D−n (t)/n− δ−(t/n)∣∣ ≤ 2ε+ op(1) (25)
sup
t≤τˆn
|Dn(t)/n− δ(t/n)| ≤ 2ε+ op(1) (26)
We nw study the stopping time Tn defined in (13) and the size of the default cascade Dn(Tn).
First assume I(pi) > pi for all pi ∈ [0, 1), i.e., pi∗ = 1. Then we have
∀τ < τˆ , δ−(τ) =
∑
j,k,θ
kδj,k,θ(τ)− τ > 0.
We have then that Tn/n = τˆ +O(ε) + op(1) and from convergence (26), since δ(τˆ) = 1−O(ε),
we obtain by tending ε to 0 that |Dn(Tn)| = n−op(n). This proves the first part of the theorem.
Now consider the case pi∗ < 1, and furthermore pi∗ is a stable fixed point of I(pi). Then
by definition of pi∗ and by using the fact that I(1) ≤ 1, we have I(pi) < pi for some interval
(pi∗, pi∗ + p˜i). Then δ−(τ) is negative in an interval (τ∗, τ∗ + τ˜), with τ∗ = λpi∗.
Let ε such that 2ε < − infτ∈(τ∗,τ∗+τ˜) δ−(τ) and denote σˆ the first iteration at which it
reaches the minimum. Since δ−(σˆ) < −2ε it follows that with high probability D−(σˆn)/n < 0,
so Tn/n = τ
∗ +O(ε) + op(1). The conclusion follows by taking the limit ε→ 0.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 3.9
Strong connectivity sparse random directed graphs with prescribed degree sequence has been
studied by Cooper and Frieze in [18]. Let λn represent the average degree (then by Condi-
tion 3.1, λn → λ as n → ∞), and µn(j, k) represent the empirical distribution of the degrees,
assumed to be proper (as defined below), then [18, Theorem 1.2] states that if∑
j,k
jk
µ(j, k)
λ
> 1, (27)
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then the graph contains w.h.p. a strongly connected giant component.
We remark that the theorem above is given in [18] under stronger assumptions on the degree
sequence, adding to Assumption 3.1 the following three conditions, in which ∆n denotes the
maximum degree:
• Let ρn = max(
∑
i,j
i2jµn(i,j)
λn
,
∑
i,j
j2iµn(i,j)
λn
). If ∆n →∞ with n then ρn = o(∆n).
• ∆n ≤ n1/12logn .
• As n→∞, νn → ν ∈ (0,∞).
Following [18] we call a degree sequence proper if it satisfies Assumption 3.1 together with the
above conditions.
A first reason for adding these conditions in [18] is to ensure that Equation (11) holds.
However, following Janson [30], the restricted set of conditions 3.1 is sufficient. The second
reason is that [18] gives more precise results on the structure of the giant component. For our
purpose, to find the sufficient condition for the existence of strongly connected giant component,
we show that these supplementary conditions may be dropped.
It is easy to see that a bounded degree sequence (i.e., ∆n = O(1)) which satisfies Assumption
3.1 is proper. We use this fact in the following.
Lemma A.11. Consider the random directed graph G∗n(d−n ,d+n ) constructed by configuration
model, where the degree sequence satisfies Assumption 3.1. If∑
j,k
jk
µ(j, k)
λ
> 1, (28)
then with high probability the graph contains a strongly connected giant component.
Proof. By the second moment property and Fatou’s lemma, there exists a constant C such that∑
j,k
jkµ(j, k) ≤
∑
j,k
(j2 + k2)µ(j, k)
≤ lim inf
n→∞
∑
j,k
(j2 + k2)µn(j, k) ≤ C.
Then, it follows that for arbitrary ε > 0, there exists a constant ∆ε such that∑
j∧k>∆ε
jkµ(j, k) ≤ ε.
Thus, by choosing ε small enough, there exists a constant ∆ε such that∑
j∧k≤∆ε
jk
µ(j, k)
λ
> 1.
We now modify the graph such that the maximum degree is equal to ∆ε: for every node i such
that d+n (i) ∧ d−n (i) > ∆ε, all its in-coming (resp. out-going) half-edges are transferred to new
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nodes with degree (0, 1) (resp. with degree (1, 0)). Since these newly created nodes cannot
be part of any strongly connected component, it follows that, if the modified graph contains
such a component, then necessarily the initial graph also does. It is then enough to evaluate
Equation (27) for this modified graph, which by construction verifies the Assumption 3.1 for
the new empirical distribution µ˜ with the average degree λ˜. Also, since the degrees of the
modified graph are bounded, the supplementary conditions above also hold, i.e., the degree
sequence is proper, and we can apply Cooper & Frieze’s result. It only remains to show that∑
j,k jk
µ˜(j,k)
λ˜
> 1. Indeed, we have
∑
j,k
jk
µ˜(j, k)
λ˜
=
∑
j∧k≤∆ε
jk
µ˜(j, k)
λ˜
=
∑
0<j,k≤∆ε
jk
µ˜(j, k)
λ˜
=
∑
0<j,k≤∆ε
jk
µ(j, k)
λ
> 1.
The last equality follows from the fact that for 0 < j, k ≤ ∆ε, we have
µ˜(j, k)
λ˜
=
µ(j, k)
λ
.
This is true since the total number of edges, and the number of nodes with degree j, k for
0 < j, k ≤ ∆ε, stays unmodified.
We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 3.9. Our proof is based on ideas applied in [21, 29]
for site and bond percolation in configuration model. Our aim is to show that the skeleton of
contagious links in the random financial network is still described by configuration model, with
a degree sequence verifying Assumptions 3.1, and then apply Lemma A.11.
For each node i, the set of contagious out-going edges is given by
Cn(i) := {l | (1−R)en(i, l) > γn(i)}.
Let us denote their number by
c+n (i) := #Cn(i).
We denote by Gcn the unweighted skeleton of contagious links in the random network G
∗
n(en),
endowed with the capital ratios γn.
In order to characterize the law of Gcn, we adapt Janson’s method [29] for the directed case.
Lemma A.12. The unweighted skeleton of contagious links Gcn has the same law as the random
graph constructed as follows:
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1. Replace the degree sequence (d+n ,d
−
n ) of size n by the degree sequence (d˜
+
n′ , d˜
−
n′) of size n
′,
with
n′ = n+mn −
n∑
i=1
c+n (i),
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, d˜+n′(i) = c+n (i), d˜−n′(i) = d−n (i),
∀ n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n′, d˜+n′(i) = 1, d˜+n′(i) = 0.
2. Construct the random unweighted graph G∗n′(d˜
+
n′ , d˜
−
n′) with n
′ nodes, and the degree se-
quence (d˜+n′ , d˜
−
n′) by configuration model.
3. Delete n+ = n′ − n randomly chosen nodes with out-degree 1 and in-degree 0.
Proof. The skeleton Gcn can be obtained in a two-step procedure. First, disconnect all non-
contagious links in G∗n(en) from their end nodes and transfer them to newly created nodes
of degree (1, 0). Then delete all new nodes and their incident edges. The first step of this
procedure may be dubbed as “rewiring”. Looking at graphs as configurations, and since the
first step changes the total number of nodes but not the number of half-edges, it is easy to
see that there is a one to one correspondence between the configurations before and after the
“rewiring”. Thus, the graph after rewiring is still described by the configuration model, and
has the same law as G∗n′(d˜
+
n′ , d˜
−
n′). Finally, by symmetry, the nodes with out-degree 1 and
in-degree 0 are equivalent, so one may remove randomly the appropriate number of them.
Note that since the degree sequence before rewiring verifies Condition 3.1, so does the
degree sequence after rewiring. Moreover, since we are interested in the strongly connected
component and nodes of degrees (1, 0) will not be included, we can actually apply Lemma
A.11 to the random graph resulting by the above contagion process. Hence, we may study the
strongly connected component in the intermediate graph G∗n′(d˜
+
n′ , d˜
−
n′).
Let us denote by ln′(j, k), the number of nodes with out-degree j and in-degree k in the
graph G∗n′(d˜
+
n′ , d˜
−
n′), and by λ˜n′ , the average degree. Then the average directed degree in this
random graph is given by νn :=
∑
j,k jkln′(j, k)/(λ˜n′n
′).
We first observe that λ˜n′n
′ = λn, since the number of edges is unchanged after rewiring of
the links. For every k > 0, the quantity
∑
j jln′(j, k) represents the number of out-going edges
belonging to nodes with in-degree k in the graph after rewiring, which in turn represents the
number of contagious out-going edges belonging to nodes with in-degree k in the graph before
rewiring. But so does
∑
j pn(j, k, 1)nµn(j, k)j. So, for all k∑
j
j
ln′(j, k)
λn′n′
=
1
λn′n′
∑
j
pn(j, k, 1)nµn(j, k)j
=
∑
j
jpn(j, k, 1)
µn(j, k)
λn
n→∞→
∑
j
jp(j, k, 1)
µ(j, k)
λ
,
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where convergence holds by the second moment property in Assumption 3.1. Applying Lemma
A.11 to the sequence of degrees in the graph after rewiring shows that when∑
k
k lim
n
∑
j
j
ln′(j, k)
λn′n′
=
∑
k
∑
j
jp(j, k, 1)
µ(j, k)
λ
> 1,
then with high probability there exists a giant strongly connected component in the skeleton
of contagious links.
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